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ABSTRACT—False beliefs and memories can affect people’s
attitudes, at least in the short term. But can they produce
real changes in behavior? This study explored whether
falsely suggesting to subjects that they had experienced a
food-related event in their childhood would lead to a
change in their behavior shortly after the suggestion and
up to 4 months later. We falsely suggested to 180 subjects
that, as children, they had gotten ill after eating egg salad.
Results showed that, after this manipulation, a significant
minority of subjects came to believe they had experienced
this childhood event even though they had initially denied
having experienced it. This newfound autobiographical
belief was accompanied by the intent to avoid egg salad,
and also by significantly reduced consumption of egg-salad
sandwiches, both immediately and 4 months after the false
suggestion. The false suggestion of a childhood event can
lead to persistent false beliefs that have lasting behavioral
consequences.
Laboratory research has demonstrated that human memory can
be remarkably fragile and even inventive. Studies on false
memories and beliefs, for example, have compellingly shown
that misleading information can lead to the creation of recol-
lections of entire events that have not occurred (Loftus, 2005). In
one of the first studies on this issue, subjects were led to believe
that when they were children, they had been lost in the shopping
mall for an extended period of time before being reunited with
their parents (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In subsequent work,
subjects falsely remembered even more unusual or upsetting
events, such as spilling a punch bowl at a wedding (Hyman,
Husband, & Billings, 1995), having a ride in a hot-air balloon
(Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002), or even having been
hospitalized as a child (Raymaekers, 2005).
Salient real-life examples of misremembering the past are
cases in which people have falsely recovered memories of
childhood sexual abuse, often instigated by suggestive thera-
peutic techniques (Geraerts et al., 2007; Loftus & Davis, 2006).
People also claim to have recovered memories of more incon-
ceivable experiences, including memories involving satanic-
ritual abuse (Scott, 2001), previous lives (Peters, Horselenberg,
Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2007), and abduction by space aliens
(Clancy, 2005), and such memories are often recovered during
suggestive therapy as well. Even though such memories may not
be real, they sometimes cause emotional pain similar to that of
people who have experienced a traumatic event (McNally et al.,
2004). This can have behavioral consequences, such as suing
the alleged perpetrator after recovering memories of childhood
abuse.
Strikingly, although a clear link between beliefs and behavior
has been found repeatedly (Ajzen, 2005), laboratory research,
until now, has not examined the possible effects of false mem-
ories on behavior. Can false beliefs be sufficiently strong to alter
behavior? If one develops false memories in the laboratory,
might they have an influence on one’s short- and long-term at-
titudes and actions? Recently, Bernstein, Laney, Morris, and
Loftus (2005a, 2005b) took the first steps toward answering this
question by developing a procedure for examining the effects of
false childhood memories and beliefs. Their subjects received
the false suggestion that they had become ill after eating a
certain food (e.g., hard-boiled eggs, strawberry ice cream) when
they were children. The false suggestion increased subjects’
confidence that the critical event had occurred. Moreover, the
false belief resulted in decreased self-reported preference for
the target food and increased anticipated behavioral avoidance
of that food.
These findings clearly demonstrate that false beliefs can in-
fluence attitudes. A remaining question, though, is whether false
beliefs or memories produce real changes in behavior. The
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current study explored whether falsely suggesting to subjects
that they had experienced a food-related event in their child-
hood would lead to a quantifiable change in their behavior.
Moreover, we examined whether lasting false beliefs can have
long-term consequences with respect to particular eating habits.
We falsely suggested to subjects that, as children, they had
become ill after eating egg salad.We then examined whether this
suggestion increased their confidence that this event had
occurred and whether they avoided the target food, in both the
short and the long term (i.e., after 4 months).
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 180 first-year undergraduates (135 women,
45 men; average age 5 20.99, SD 5 2.76) at Maastricht Uni-
versity in The Netherlands. Subjects were all screened to ensure
that they did not have eating disorders. We randomly assigned
subjects to one of two groups: Subjects in the egg-salad group
(n5 120) received the false suggestion that they had gotten sick
after eating egg salad as a child. The remaining 60 subjects were
in the control group and did not receive this false suggestion. All
instructions were given in Dutch.
Materials and Procedure
Subjects initially signed up for a study called ‘‘Food and Per-
sonality.’’ After 4 months, they were recontacted by a different
experimenter, who asked them to enroll in an allegedly separate
study.
During the first session, subjects completed a 24-item food-
history inventory (Bernstein et al., 2005b) containing the critical
event, ‘‘got sick after eating egg salad.’’ They rated whether or
not each event on this inventory happened to them before their
10th birthday, using a scale ranging from 1 (definitely did not
happen) to 8 (definitely did happen). Subjects also completed a
questionnaire about their food preferences, rating how much
they liked to eat 62 different foods, including egg salad. Finally,
subjects imagined being at a party with a variety of foods and
beverages available and indicated their likelihood of consuming
each of 20 options, including the critical item, egg salad.
During the second session, which occurred exactly 1 week
later, subjects received false feedback about their responses to
the questionnaires that they had completed during the first
session. We falsely told subjects that we had entered their re-
sponses into a computer that had then generated a profile of their
early childhood experiences with certain foods.We told subjects
that, as young children, they disliked Brussels sprouts, enjoyed
eating pizza, and felt happy when a classmate brought sweets to
school. Additionally, subjects in the egg-salad group were told,
‘‘You got sick after eating egg salad.’’ To ensure that subjects in
this group thought about this feedback, we told them that the
computer randomly selected one feedback item for them to
elaborate on, and that the item was egg salad (for a detailed
description of the materials and procedure, see Bernstein et al.,
2005a). Control subjects responded to a filler item.
After this elaboration phase, subjects again completed the
food-history inventory, food-preferences questionnaire, and
party-behavior questionnaire. Responses on these question-
naires were used to determine whether there were changes in
(a) subjects’ confidence that the critical event had happened in
their childhood and (b) their avoidance of the critical item. Sub-
jects also completed a memory-belief form with questions per-
taining to three events from the food-history inventory, including
the critical item. They were asked to indicate whether they had a
specific belief or memory of each of these events from before age
10. If they had a specific memory of an event, they wrote ‘‘M’’ and
gave as many details as possible, and if they believed the event
happened but had no specific memory of it, they wrote ‘‘B’’ and
explained why they believed the event happened. If they were
positive that the event did not happen, they wrote ‘‘P’’ and
explained why they were so sure that the event did not happen.
Finally, subjects were taken in small groups to another room,
where they received a bogus debriefing. In the beginning of this
15-min period, subjects were told that the researchers wanted to
thank them for their participation by providing a treat, and a
catering company brought in drinks and sandwiches with five
different fillings: egg salad (critical item), tuna salad, chicken
salad, cheese, and ham. While the alleged debriefing was given,
the experimenter, who did not know the group to which each
subject had been assigned, recorded what type of sandwiches
the subjects chose.
After 4 months, another experimenter recontacted the sub-
jects to recruit them for an allegedly separate study at another
laboratory at Maastricht University. In total, 153 (85%) subjects
agreed to participate. They were told that this study (in reality,
the third session) involved a taste test designed to examine
people’s preferences for certain types of food. The procedure of
this taste test was adapted from the methods of Herman and
Polivy (1980).
Subjects were asked to evaluate five different types of fruit-
flavored water (lime, raspberry, tropical punch, apple, and tan-
gerine) and five types of sandwiches (ham, cheese, chicken
salad, tuna salad, and egg salad), using 8-point scales to rate
them for appearance, smell, flavor, and food preference. While
preserving quantity, we ensured that the sandwiches had a
different appearance than in the second session so as not to
remind subjects of that session. Next, subjects were instructed to
complete three (filler) questionnaires. They were also told that
the residual food would be thrown away, and that they should
feel free to consume as much as they wanted. After 15 min,
the food was removed. Subjects then again completed the
food-history inventory, food-preferences questionnaire, party-
behavior questionnaire, and memory-belief form. We changed
the layout of all these questionnaires so as to disguise the link
with the previous sessions.
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After completing the questionnaires, subjects were asked
what they thought the purpose of the new study was and whether
they thought the third session was a study separate from the first
two sessions. Only 5 subjects (1 in the egg-salad group, 4 in the
control group) reported that the study was about memory, and no
subjects reported that the study was about false memories.1
Thus, the contributions of social desirability to the results were
minimized.2 All subjects thought the sessions were unrelated.
Finally, subjects were debriefed about the entire research proj-
ect. They were also asked whether we could verify with their
parents if they might have truly gotten sick from eating egg salad
as a child.
RESULTS
Subjects were considered to have arguably true memories (a) if
they both scored above the midpoint for the critical item on the
food-history inventory during the first session and reported a
belief or memory for the critical egg-salad event or (b) if their
parents confirmed that they had gotten sick after eating egg salad
as a child. Five subjects met these criteria3 and were excluded
from analyses. After these subjects were excluded, the re-
maining sample consisted of 117 subjects in the experimental
group and 58 subjects in the control group. Next, in the egg-
salad group, we identified subjects who were believers (n5 41)
and nonbelievers (n 5 58; see Morris, Laney, Bernstein, &
Loftus, 2006). Subjects were considered believers if they met
two criteria: Their confidence that the critical event happened
had to increase after they received the false feedback, and they
had to report a memory or belief related to the critical event on
the memory-belief form (3 believers, 7%, reported a memory,
rather than a belief). Nonbelievers were subjects whose confi-
dence that the critical egg-salad event had happened remained
the same or decreased after they received the false feedback. Of
the 153 subjects who returned to the lab for the third session,
35 were believers, 54 were nonbelievers, and 50 were control
subjects.
Confidence and Preference
Results for the attitudinal measures replicated previous findings
(e.g., Bernstein et al., 2005a): Although responses to the food-
history inventory showed no group differences in subjects’ ini-
tial confidence that the critical egg-salad event had happened,
responses in both the second and the third sessions, after sub-
jects in the egg-salad group had received the false feedback,
indicated that believers were significantly more confident that
they had gotten sick from eating egg salad than nonbelievers and
control subjects were, all ts > 11.73, all ps < .001 (see Fig. 1).
Between the first and second sessions, believers’ confidence that
they had experienced this event increased an average of 3.29
points on the 8-point scale, t(40) 5 11.95, p < .001, d 5 2.32.
Also, in both sessions after the false feedback, believers
reported significantly less preference for egg salad on the
food-preferences and party-behavior questionnaires than did
nonbelievers and control subjects. Finally, during the taste
testing in the third session, believers gave the egg-salad sand-
wiches lower ratings for appearance and flavor than did non-
believers and control subjects.4
Eating Behavior
The critical findings concerned whether the false suggestion
affected actual eating behavior. In fact, the groups differed in the
number of egg-salad sandwiches eaten in the second session,
F(2, 154)5 12.45, p< .001, Z25 .14, and in the third session,
F(2, 136)5 3.55, p5 .031,Z25 .05. Specifically, in the second
session, believers and nonbelievers both ate fewer egg-salad
sandwiches than did control subjects, t(97) 5 3.10, p 5 .003,
d 5 0.63, and t(114)5 4.32, p < .001, d5 0.81, respectively,
but the numbers of egg-salad sandwiches eaten by believers and
nonbelievers did not differ significantly (t < 1). In the third
session, believers ate fewer egg-salad sandwiches than did both
nonbelievers, t(87) 5 2.08, p 5 .041, d 5 0.44, and control
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Fig. 1. Subjects’ mean confidence that they had gotten ill after eating egg
salad as a child, as a function of session. Session 1 was before the false
suggestion, Session 2 was 1 week later, and Session 3 was 4 months later.
Results are shown separately for subjects who believed the false sugges-
tion, subjects who did not believe the false suggestion, and control sub-
jects (who were not exposed to the false suggestion). Error bars represent
standard errors of the means.
1Excluding these subjects from analyses did not change the results. Note that
no subjects had yet completed courses on memory or false memory.
2Previous findings showed that social desirability could not account for
significant variance in effects of false beliefs on attitudes (e.g., Laney, Bowman
Fowler, Nelson, Bernstein, & Loftus, in press).
3The egg-salad memories of all 5 subjects who met the first criterion were also
confirmed by their parents. 4Complete reports of the analyses are available from the first author.
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subjects, t(83)5 3.02, p5 .003, d 5 0.66 (see Fig. 2). In both
sessions, the three groups did not differ in their consumption of
the other types of sandwiches, all Fs < 1.38, ps > .25.
DISCUSSION
This study shows that falsely suggesting that a person experi-
enced a childhood event can change that person’s behavior
considerably, in both the short and the longer term. We falsely
suggested to subjects that, as children, they had become ill after
eating egg salad. After this manipulation, a significant minority
of our subjects came to believe they had experienced this event.
More important, this newfound autobiographical belief was ac-
companied by significantly reduced consumption of egg-salad
sandwiches, both immediately and 4 months after the false
suggestion.
Our findings show that, at least in the short term, simply
having received the false feedback deterred both believers and
nonbelievers from actually eating egg salad. Thus, they exhib-
ited a contagion effect (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). That is, all
subjects who received the false feedback must have been re-
minded of what it must feel like to become ill after eating egg
salad. This finding also indicates that suggestions about the past
may have more persistent effects on behavior than on self-re-
ports, at least in the short term. Such a dissociation between
behavior and self-reports is a well-known phenomenon in social
psychology (Greenwald et al., 2002).
However, in the third session, we found a significant differ-
ence between believers and nonbelievers in their consumption
of egg-salad sandwiches. That is, the false feedback that was
given 4 months earlier did not seem to have had a lasting effect
on nonbelievers, who ate more egg-salad sandwiches than
believers did at this session. It is possible that believers had
been contemplating the egg-salad event and had consequently
created memories about having gotten ill after eating egg salad
as a child.
Of course, we cannot prove the falseness of the reports sub-
jects provided. One could definitely claim that the manipulation
triggered true memories rather than creating false ones. How-
ever, because we sought corroboration from subjects’ parents,
we can be fairly certain that the subjects whose data we analyzed
did not experience the critical event when they were children.
Our findings demonstrate that it is possible, in at least a sig-
nificant minority of adult subjects, to induce lasting false beliefs
that have consequences not only for attitudes, but also for be-
havior (see also Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Jarry, 2008). Scholars
should consider this when conducting research on false beliefs,
because some subjects might experience adverse outcomes from
an experimentally induced false belief. These findings also have
important implications for people’s food and dieting choices.
That is, possibly people could learn to avoid certain foods, and
thus have healthier eating habits, by believing that they had
negative childhood experiences with unhealthy foods. With
overweight and obesity having reached epidemic levels around
the world (Ogden et al., 2006), the influence of false beliefs on
eating behavior seems an essential topic for future work, which
should explore whether the consequences of actually having
gotten sick after eating a food are similar to the consequences of
having a false belief that one has experienced this event. Also, it
would be interesting to investigate whether certain individual
differences (e.g., suggestibility) may mediate or explain the
effects on short- and long-term behavior that we found in this
study. In any case, this study clearly demonstrates that false
suggestions about childhood events can profoundly change
people’s attitudes and behavior.
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